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Chief Justice Wright and the Third Party
Beneficiary Problem
By JAMES E. CRAWFORD*
To the nineteenth century legal mind the propositions that no man
was his brother's keeper, that the race was to the swift and that the
devil should take the hindmost seemed not only obvious but moral-
ly right. The most striking feature of nineteenth century contract
theory is the narrow scope of social duty which it implicitly as-
sumed. In our own century we have witnessed what it does not
seem too fanciful to describe as a socialization of our theory of
contract. The progressive expansion of the range of non-parties
allowed to sue as contract beneficiaries as well as of the situations
in which they have been allowed to sue is one of the entries to be
made in this ledger.'
Introduction
The court over which Chief Justice Donald Wright presided between
1970 and 1977 was generally conceded to be one of the nation's most
outstanding. Within the last half century, the California Supreme Court had
reached a position of eminence that few other state courts could match, with
a solid reputation for innovative and widely imitated approaches to difficult
problems. The reasons for this development are varied. The state's geo-
graphic location at the westernmost reaches of the continent and its remote-
ness, both temporal and geographic, from the early dominance of the
English common law, instilled a spirit of venturousness. Spanish influence
antedated that of the English and resulted in a cultural pluralism. Remote-
ness from major national centers of common law development and a frontier
tradition undoubtedly led to a greater tendency toward legislative dominance
and innovation than would otherwise have been the case. The necessity of
interpreting a large body of legislative enactments and of resolving disputes
in a frontier atmosphere in turn spawned an early tendency to judicial
activism that has continued into the present era. With the growth of popula-
tion and commercial centers, and of a bench and bar of high caliber, the
preeminent position of the state's highest court was assured. 2
* A.B., 1956, University of Illinois; LL.B., 1960, University of Illinois; A.M., 1965,
Stanford University. Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
1. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1970).
2. See generally G. WHIrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 292-316 (1976).
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By 1970, then, the court was firmly established as one of the nation's
busiest and most influential. In the preceding two decades, many influential
cases had served to broaden and reorient the traditional understanding and
attitudes regarding contract law, including questions of interpretation,
parol evidence, and foreseeable detrimental reliance as a basis for enforce-
ment.3 These cases had received wide notice and assumed importance
beyond California's borders. By contrast, the first few years of the 1970's
were not conspicuous for either the number or lasting consequence of
contract law opinions rendered; the most notable of the court's opinions
tended to be centered in other areas.4 As a result of the state's increasing
population and commercial importance, however, the number of contract
disputes reaching the intermediate appellate courts remained unabated.
Moreover, one of the decade's most significant California Supreme Court
contract opinions,5 which was rendered at the end of the period under
review, is already receiving nationwide attention.
Chief Justice Wright wrote for the majority of the court in three notable
contract opinions during his tenure. 6 The question raised by the more
significant of these will loom large in the future development of the law and
is the subject of this analysis. 7 Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc. ,8
3. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d
33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968); Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65
Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Monarco
v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). For a discussion of significant opinions
nominally falling within the tort area, but with strong contract overtones, see Tobriner,
Retrospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 5 (1972). There is
a detailed discussion of the preceding contract cases in Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the
Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812 (1961).
4. One should not overstate this point. For example, Chief Justice Wright wrote for a
unanimous court in an opinion that held that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action by alleging
that late charges, calculated as a fixed percentage of the unpaid principal of a secured loan,
were penal and thus unenforceable. Garret v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d
731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973). The opinion was both significant and innovative in
its characterization of the charges as liquidated damages which were then subject to statutory
regulation. For a review of the court's concerns mid-point during Chief Justice Wright's tenure,
see Goodman & Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns
of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309 (1974).
5. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr.
882 (1976).
6. These three cases are: Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d
1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976); Martinez v. Socoma Cos., Inc., II Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113
Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974); Garret v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 197,
108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
7. Of less significance because its result was predictable on the basis of past judicial
developments was MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809,488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971).
In that case the court granted relief against forfeiture to a willfully defaulting purchaser of real
property. On the history of this development in California law, see J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA
SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 3.42 (1970), and J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE
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found the court on the troubled waters of a claim to recovery by persons not
parties to the contract in suit. The case was further complicated by the fact
that the federal government was the promisee and the alleged beneficiaries
were hard-core unemployed persons residing in a Los Angeles ghetto and
claiming benefits for lost wages and employment opportunities as a result of
the breach of contract. In writing for a narrow 4-3 majority, which held that
the nonparties could not recover as third party beneficiaries of this contract, 9
the Chief Justice produced a workmanlike opinion in the traditional sense.
Dissatisfaction with the rationale for the decision stems from a sense of
unease and frustration at the failure to allow freer rein to the judicial
imagination ° and to undertake a greater quest for understanding of the
social and political context in which the legal controversy arose. 1 The
reasons for this unease will become more apparent after a consideration of
the legal setting of the dispute, an analysis of the opinion, and a discussion
of a suggested alternative mode of analysis. The writer concludes that the
court missed an opportunity to deal dispositively with this important aspect
of the third party beneficiary problem and that its resolution remains for the
future.
I. The Nature of the Problem
The early common law was simple-minded in the positive sense of that
term. In any system built upon precedent, perceived consistency with earlier
conclusions has a tendency to become an end in itself rather than merely a
means to an end. 12 Few areas of contract law have consistently raised more
thorny theoretical and practical difficulties for lawyers, judges, and scholars
TRANSACTIONS § 2.10 (1974). The course of this development in light of the peculiarities of
California land law are discussed in Hetland, The California Land Contract, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
729 (1960).
8. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974). See generally Comment, Third
Party Beneficiaries in Government Contracts, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 126 (1975); Note, Third Party
Beneficiaries-Persons For Whom The Government Contracts to Provide Training and Employ-
ment Are Not Third Party Beneficiaries, 88 HARV. L. REV. 646 (1975); Note, Martinez v.
Socoma Companies: Problems In Determining Contract Beneficiaries 'Rights, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
137 (1975).
9. 11 Cal. 3d at 407, 521 P.2d at 849, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
10. On the problem of creative judicial craftsmanship and the imaginative molding of
precedent to meet changing circumstances, see Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of
Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812 (1961).
11. This common judicial failure has been commented on widely. See, e.g., J. NOONAN,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Facts and
Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833. Drawing examples from legal history, Professor
Noonan avers that each of the decisions reached an unfair result because of failure to inject a
humanizing element into legal rules.
12. This point, while true, is often exaggerated. See Prologue to L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
Fall 1977] THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY PROBLEM
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
than the rights of nonparties to enforce contractual promises. The roots of
the problem are traceable to the principle of stare decisis; the continuing
difficulty stems from the incompatibility of third party rights with traditional
notions of contract.
In our highly industrialized society, the notion that promises between
consenting adults might not be enforced by the legal system seems so
strange as to be ludicrous. It is obvious that economic progress and momen-
tum in our modified free enterprise economy are bottomed upon relatively
free exchange transactions between willing buyers and sellers. Such was not
always the case. Several centuries passed before the idea of private, legally-
enforceable bargains gained ascendency in the common law. 13 Even when
fully operative, contract law was framed by relatively narrow restrictions;
not all promises were enforceable. In time, notions of offer, acceptance, and
consideration in the sense of something bargained and given in exchange for
a promise became so familiar as to be axiomatic. Given these basic require-
ments and the necessary capacity to contract, the question in most contract
controversies then shifted to the meaning and application of the agreement
itself. Here, it was said, the court's function was to discover and give effect
to the intention of the parties; that is, the presumed intention, for if the
actual intention were expressed or otherwise manifest there would be no
need for judicial inquiry. Serviceable theories and precedents for dealing
with two-party problems of this nature evolved and were refined through a
long course of judicial construction and interpretation. 14
If a third party is added to the contract equation, a party outside the role
of either promisor or promisee, a conceptual difficulty arises that has never
been satisfactorily resolved by the Anglo-American legal system. Tradition-
ally, for example, if A promised B, in exchange for consideration from B,
that A would perform some act of benefit to C, there was little conceptual
difficulty in the judicial enforcement of A's promise at the suit of B. Such a
cause of action fit neatly within the traditional framework of contract law. In
such a suit, the fact that C was to benefit from A's promise was immaterial.
The action was neither by nor for him in its outward trappings and he was
thus not a part of the judicial equation. But suppose that B either could or
would not sue to enforce A's promise. If C himself brought the action,
conceptual difficulties reached insuperable levels initially. As might be
expected, the early cases held that a nonparty could not enforce a contract
promise in an action at law. 15 Recognition of the nonparty's right to sue
13. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941); Holdsworth, Debt,
Assumpsit and Consideration, 11 MICH. L. REV. 347 (1913).
14. H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT (1961).
15. See, e.g., National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878), where the opinion by
Justice Strong reveals clearly the basic difficulty presented to common law courts when third
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followed the same tortuous and uneven course of development that the
original promisor-promisee right to sue had taken. 16
Common law judges believed, however, that there was more reason to
allow C to sue A if A, by fulfilling his promise to B, would be discharging
a debt from B to C. The rationale for their belief rested on the similarity of
such an action to that of debt, which played a prominent role in early
contract law theory. 17 C, in the situation just described, became known as a
creditor beneficiary; such a beneficiary was distinguished from the nonparty
who was found to be merely the object of a gratuity from the promisee, i.e.,
a donee beneficiary.18 If C were the promisee's creditor, several matters of
concern were satisfactorily answered for the courts. The underlying question
of why the promisee chose to benefit the nonparty was answered and that, in
turn, helped to obviate the inherent skepticism that lay at the root of many
contract requirements such as consideration and a writing.
In addition to the above distinction, an even more difficult problem
arose. Surely every person who might benefit in some way by A's perform-
ance of his contractual duty to B should not be allowed to sue. The
overriding issue became how to distinguish the nonparty who had a cause of
action from the one who did not. In time the distinguishing characteristic
came to this: Was an intention manifested in the A-B contract that C was to
benefit? If so, C had the power to sue for breach in his own right if A failed
to perform, even if there was no preexisting debt relationship between B and
C. If, on the other hand, the requisite intention was not found, C did not
have a cause of action against A. In this latter case, C was considered an
persons sued on contracts made by others: lack of privity and lack of consideration moving
from the third party plaintiff. In England, the even earlier and consistent holding that third
party beneficiaries could not recover came to be referred to as the rule of Tweedle v. Atkinson,
I B & S 5393, 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (1861). Third party beneficiary contracts are still not generally
enforceable by the beneficiary in England, although, as has been observed, various devices are
utilized to circumvent this rule. See Comment, Third Party Beneficiary Contracts in England,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 544 (1968). Lack of comfort with the third party beneficiary concept is
reflected in early California cases that proceeded on the theory that as to any third party
beneficiary, the underlying contract was merely an offer that had to be accepted by bringing an
action. See More v. Hutchinson, 187 Cal. 623, 203 P. 97 (1921).
16. See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 810 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as CORmN]; 2 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 354 (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
17. See Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1969).
18. The creditor-donee dichotomy has been the subject of severe criticism primarily for
being misleading because of the overlap and difficulty of classification in many cases.
Nevertheless, it is firmly woven into the fabric of American law. CORBIN, supra note 16, at §
774; WILLISTON, supra note 16, at § 356. In RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, § 133, at
290 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967) (reporter's note), the terms "creditor beneficiary" and "donee
beneficiary" are eliminated and the term "intended beneficiary" substituted with a definition
broad enough to encompass both. Despite this suggested change, it is predictable that the earlier
and familiar terminology will continue to be used by courts and lawyers.
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"incidental" beneficiary and his contractual rights could be vindicated only
if B, the promisee, chose to bring suit.19
The previous discussion assumed a third party plaintiff in a suit in
which the underlying contract was executed in a private context. Two major
obstacles have further combined and continue to inhibit recovery by an
aggrieved nonparty plaintiff suing on a contract in which a governmental
entity is the promisee. The first difficulty is rooted in the philosophical
premises of democratic government. Governmental action was and con-
tinues to be viewed as beneficial by definition. Therefore, every contract
made by a governmental instrumentality is aimed at improving the general
public welfare. The legal system could not tolerate a situation in which
every member of the public could maintain an action in every situation in
which he might somehow feel aggrieved. Therefore, it is generally held that
a citizen can sue as a third party beneficiary of a government contract only in
extraordinary circumstances. 20
The unarticulated basis of the second obstacle is that enforcement of
the duty in the case at hand would result in an intolerably high commercial
burden upon the promisor. Most situations in which a member of the public
is seeking a remedy as a third party beneficiary involve actions for conse-
quential rather than ordinary compensatory damages.21 The judiciary has
19. The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 133 (1932) provides: "Definition of Donee Bene-
ficiary, Creditor Beneficiary, Incidental Beneficiary.
"(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than the
promisee, that person is, except as stated in Subsection (3): (a) a donee beneficiary if it
appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to
make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the benefi-
ciary; (b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the promise will
satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of
the beneficiary against the promisee which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a
discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds; (c) an
incidental beneficiary if neither the facts state in Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause (b) exist.
"(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (la) is a gift promise. Such a promise as
is described in Subsection (lb) is a promise to discharge the promisee's duty.
"(3) Where it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances that the purpose of the promisee is to benefit a beneficiary under a trust and the
promise is to render performance to the trustee, the trustee, and not the beneficiary under the
trust, is a beneficiary within the meaning of this Section."
20. It has been suggested, both before and after the Watergate revelations, that the
essentially benevolent nature of government presupposed by our system has no basis in fact.
See, e.g., B. WASSERSTEIN & M. GREEN, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME (1970). Later study may in
fact prove that some of the populace's residuum of good will toward its elected leaders has
dissipated with time. See generally G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE (1963).
21. See, e.g., WILLISTON, supra note 16, at §§ 373, 374; CORBIN, supra note 16, at §§ 805,
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tended to avoid granting recovery in such a situation because of their fear
that the economic system might, as a result, become overloaded. Most of
the opinions in this area are factually obsolete since they involve private
defendant companies performing public functions such as water service.
Today, these functions are most often assumed by a governmental entity or
by a governmentally created and regulated public utility whose liability for
service defaults is tightly circumscribed in exchange for rate regulation and
monopoly status. 22
Though factually inapposite to today's world, the underlying premise
of the older opinions appears to exert a powerful influence on the current
judicial attitude toward the use of a promise made to a governmental entity
as the basis for suit. Chief Judge Cardozo's opinion in H.R. Moch Co., Inc.
v. Rensselaer Water Co. 2 3 is illustrative. Defendant had agreed to supply
water to inhabitants of the city at a stated rate. Failure to supply water at a
critical time led to the destruction by fire of plaintiffs' building. In denying
plaintiffs recovery as third party beneficiaries, the New York Court of
Appeals emphasized the near-limitless liability a commercial enterprise
would face if forced to respond to individual members of the public for
damages consequent to such a breach of contract: "An intention to assume
an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public is seen to
be the more improbable when we recall the crushing burden that the
obligation would impose ... "I Therefore, the litany concluded, it could
not have been the intention of the parties to assume: contractual liability in
such cases.25 With this background in mind, an uphill battle for the plaintiffs
in Martinez v. Socoma Cos., Inc. 26 was predictable.
II. The Martinez Case
The seeds of dispute in Martinez were planted as part of the much
heralded Great Society movement of the Lyndon Johnson presidency. 27 As
was true of most decaying urban areas throughout the United States, the East
22. Although the basic point remains true, third party beneficiary suits against such.
private companies continue to arise periodically. See, e.g., Luis v. Orcutt Town Water Co., 204
Cal. App. 2d 433, 22 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1962). See generally J. BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES (1976).
23. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
24. Id. at 165, 159 N.E. at 897-98.
25. Id.
26. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
27. Johnson's "Great Society Speech" was delivered at the commencement exercises of
the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, on May 22, 1964. The aspect of the resulting "War on
Poverty" at issue in Martinez stemmed from the addition in 1966 of the Special Impact
Program, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 113, 80 Stat. 1455 (1966), to the, Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed 1972).
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Los Angeles barrio was characterized by extraordinarily high poverty,
crime, and disease rates-the usual concomitants of chronic high unemploy-
ment. Seeking to reverse the flight of small-and medium-sized industries to
suburban areas and to provide an incentive for investment in high risk areas,
the Johnson administration sought an immediate positive impact by welding
a partnership between government and industry that would launch a frontal
attack on this steadily-worsening problem.
A. Judicial Proceedings
In exchange for, federal dollars to cushion the risk factor, the three
defendant companies28 agreed to renovate an unused jail in East Los
Angeles and to hire and train a minimum number of certified hard-core
unemployed residents of that area. 29 As was unfortunately true of many of
the "War on Poverty" programs, the sanguine hopes expressed at the outset
for a mutually beneficial and successful endeavor did not reach fruition. It
was alleged that a total of $1,252,200 was received by the defendants but
that they failed to perform their contractual promises. 3) The contracts had
provided for 1,600 entry level jobs at minimum wage and normal advance-
ment of participants to more skilled and higher level administrative posi-
tions. 31 In fact, only 276 persons were hired at all under the contracts, and of
these, 229 were terminated. 32
On behalf of themselves and others alleged to be beneficiaries of the
contract between the defendants and the government, 33 the plaintiffs brought
28. The companies were Socoma Companies, Inc., Lady Fair Kitchens, Inc., and
Monarch Electronics International, Inc. Socoma was to receive $950,000 in federal funds; Lady
Fair, $999,000; and Monarch, $800,000. 11 Cal. 3d at 398, 521 P.2d at 843, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
Relying on an alter ego theory, plaintiffs also named eleven individuals (alleged to be officers of
the companies) as defendants on the grounds that they undercapitalized their respective
corporations. In addition, three counts of the complaint sought to impose joint venturer liability
upon the three corporations. Lady Fair, a Utah Corporation, and the individual defendants
associated with it did not make appearances at trial and were not represented on appeal. Id.
29. The contracts provided for a 22-year lease of the jail building and a minimum capital
investment by each defendant of $5,000,000. Id.
30. See id. at 399, 521 P.2d at 844, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
31. Socoma had agreed to hire 650 of the certified hard-core unemployed persons, Lady
Fair to hire 550, and Monarch, 400. The workers were to be employed for a minimum of one
year at the rate of $2.00 per hour for the first 90 days and a minimum of $2.25 per hour
thereafter, or at the local prevailing wage rate, whichever was higher. The contracts also
contained provisions for the orderly promotion of employees to supervisory positions and for
employee stock purchase plans providing for up to 30% ownership in the companies by a
procedure specified in the contracts. Id. at 406, 410, 521 P.2d at 849, 851-52, 113 Cal. Rptr. at
593, 595-96.
32. According to the allegations, Monarch hired no workers at all. Socoma created 186
jobs of which, it was alleged, 139 were wrongfully terminated, while Lady Fair provided 90 jobs
but wrongfully terminated all of them. Id. at 399, 521 P.2d at 844, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
33. Plaintiffs claimed that they were members of a class containing "no more than 2,017"
persons from the East Los Angeles area who were certified as disadvantaged and thus the only
persons eligible for employment under the contracts. Id.
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a class action for damages caused by the defendants' nonperformance.
General demurrers were sustained in the lower courts without leave to
amend, apparently on the ground that plaintiffs and the class they allegedly
represented were without standing as third party beneficiaries of the subject
contracts.34 Writing for a sharply divided (4-3) California Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Wright's opinion affirmed the dismissal of the complaints,
holding that there was no evidence indicating that the defendant companies
were to be liable to plaintiffs if the companies failed to fulfill their contractu-
al promises. 3
5
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
Against this background, the nature of Chief Justice Wright's opinion
in Martinez can be amplified. As noted, noncontract parties having enforce-
able contract rights are classified either as creditor beneficiaries or donee
beneficiaries. 36 The former status could not be accorded these plaintiffs
because no underlying legal duty from the government to them could be
found that would be discharged by defendants' performance of their contract
duties. Lacking creditor beneficiary status, plaintiffs were forced to traverse
the rockier path as donees of the government contract, and a relatively
simple passage to recovery was lost.
37
I. The Intention to Make a Gift
Following the first Restatement of Contracts, Chief Justice Wright
asserted that in order to acquire the status of donee beneficiary, the promisee
must intend either to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon the
beneficiary a right against the promisor that is enforceable by an action at
law. 38 In the former case, the promisor must have known of the intent to
make a gift from the nature of the contract and the surrounding circum-
stances. While acknowledging that plaintiffs were among those whom the
government intended to benefit through these contracts, the court concluded
that the fact that governmental programs conferred benefits upon recipients
34. Id. at 397, 521 P.2d at 843, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
35. Id. at 402, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590. Justice Burke wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Mosk and Tobriner joined.
36. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
37. The legal system's concern is with the prevention of fraud and various forms of
perjured testimony. In the two-party contract situation, the existence of consideration is
thought to obviate this risk since it is assumed that each person, as a tenet of human nature,
seeks to benefit himself in most exchange transactions. Thus, it is the fact of consideration
rather than equivalences in the values exchanged that is of concern to the system. Where
benefit to a non-party is asserted as the consideration, possibilities for abuse are presented. If
the non-party is a creditor of the promisee, however, an obvious benefit to the latter results
from the promisor's performance and no further indication of intention need be shown.
38. 11 Cal. 3d at 400-01, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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who were not required to furnish consideration did not necessarily imply an
intention to bestow gifts upon these citizens. 39 Alleviating unemployment,
according to the court, was in furtherance of the constitutional mandate to
provide for the general welfare and therefore transcended any notion of
intent to bestow gifts upon these particular individuals.
In providing for special impact programs, Congress declared that
such programs were directed to the solution of critical problems
existing in particular neighborhoods having especially large con-
centrations of low-income persons, and that the programs were
intended to be of sufficient size and scope to have an appreciable
impact in such neighborhoods in arresting tendencies toward de-
pendency, chronic unemployment, and rising community ten-
sions. . . . Thus the contracts here were designed not to benefit
individuals as such but to utilize the training and employment of
disadvantaged persons as a means of improving the East Los
Angeles neighborhood.40
This devastating non sequitur was followed by further indications that
the court majority was firmly wedded to a "sole Congressional purpose"
rationale; that is, it would not entertain the possibility of a dual purpose that
would inure to the benefit of plaintiffs.
[T]he means by which the contracts were intended to accomplish
this community improvement were not confined to provision of the
particular benefits on which plaintiffs base their claim to dam-
ages. . . . Rather the objective was to be achieved by establishing
permanent industries in which local residents would be permanent-
ly employed and would have opportunities to become supervisors,
managers and part owners. 41
After buttressing this phase of the argument by reference to the large capital
investment required of each company and the long-term lease they were to
assume on the former jail facilities, the court continued:
Presumably, as the planned enterprises prospered, the quantity and
quality of employment and economic opportunity that they pro-
vided would increase and would benefit not only employees but
also their families, other local enterprises and the government itself
through reduction of law enforcement and welfare costs.
The fact that plaintiffs were in a position to benefit more
directly than certain other members of the public from perform-
ance of the contract does not alter their status as incidental be-
neficiaries. (See Rest., Contracts, Sec. 145, illus. 1: C, a member of
the public cannot recover for injury from B's failure to perform a
contract with the United States to carry mail over a certain route.)42
39. Id. at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
40. Id. at 405-06, 521 P.2d at 849, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 406, 521 P.2d at 849, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
42. Id. (footnote omitted). Apparently convinced that this closing illustration had special
relevance to the point at hand, the court was careful to indicate by means of a footnote that this
same illustration was repeated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 145, illus. 1, at 77
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967). 1I Cal. 3d at 406 n.9, 521 P.2d at 849 n.9, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 593 n.9.
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Thus, although the court had initially entertained at least the possibility
of recovery on a donee-gift rationale, it quickly foreclosed that possibility
without the sustained analysis that the plaintiffs' claim and the court's own
explicit uncertainty would appear to have justified, especially in view of the
court's initial assertion that plaintiffs were "[u]nquestionably . . . among
those whom the Government intended to benefit through the defendant's
performance of the contracts .... 3 As the dissent forcefully argued, the
principal weakness of the Chief Justice's analysis at this point was its failure
to discuss the possibility of a dual governmental purpose, both in enacting
the enabling legislation and in concluding the contracts in suit.'
2. The Intention to Confer a Right
With the foreclosure of the donee-gift avenue, there remained one
further theory by which the plaintiffs could effectively have asserted donee
beneficiary rights: In making the contract with the corporate defendants,
was the government's purpose to confer "a right upon the plaintiffs against
the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be
due from the promisee [the Government] to the beneficiary [the
plaintiff]"?' 5 Obviously, the most direct method of assuring that nonparty
plaintiffs could sue defaulting promisors for breach would have been a
provision to that effect in the contract. The Government's bargaining power
in the circumstances would certainly have enabled it to insist upon such a
provision. Since there was no specific contract term in this regard, however,
evidence of such an intention or lack of the same had to be gathered from the
"terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances.' '46
In Chief Justice Wright's view all evidence pointed to the conclusion
that there was no intention that the plaintiffs should have a cause of action
against the defaulting contractors. The provision that disputes of fact arising
under the contract were to be resolved through administrative channels 47
43. 11 Cal. 3d at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
44. As Justice Burke noted in dissent: "The majority contend that the congressional
purpose in enacting the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (including the subsequent amend-
ments thereto creating the Special Impact Program), and the government's purpose in executing
the instant contracts with defendants pursuant to the Act, was to benefit only the general public
and particularly the local neighborhoods where these programs were to be implemented. ...
The majority err in the above conclusion because the congressional purpose was to benefit both
the communities in which the impact programs are established and the individual impoverished
persons in such communities. . . . In accord with this expressed intent, the substantive
provisions of the contracts confer a direct benefit upon the class seeking to enforce them." I I
Cal. 3d at 408-09, 521 P.2d at 850-51, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 594-95 (Burke, J., dissenting).
45. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a).
46. Id. at § 133(3).
47. Administrative review involved determination by a government contracting officer in
the first instance, with appeal to the Secretary of Labor and final resort to the courts in certain
limited situations. I I Cal. 3d at 402, 521 P.2d at 840, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
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was said to argue against the position asserted by the plaintiffs. The court
also felt that if actions such as the present, in which the government was not
even a party, were allowed to proceed to judgment, the "efficiency" and
"uniformity of interpretation" made possible by administrative procedures
would be undermined. 48 But the question of why efficiency and uniformity
of interpretation should take precedence over other values was not ad-
dressed. Similarly, the court did not explore the possibility of allowing these
plaintiffs access to the courts after the exhaustion of their administrative
remedies with the degree of concern that would appear to have been
warranted. 49
In addition, the court found in each of the contracts at issue liquidated
damages provisions that obligated the defendant contractors to refund to the
government, in the event of default, all money received, without interest,
plus a stated dollar amount for each employment opportunity they failed to
provide.50 By this mechanism, the court argued, the defendants had bar-
gained to limit their liability for breach of contract. It was likely that the
government had used the possibility of limited liability to induce the defend-
ants to make their contractual commitments in the first place; to subject
them now to liability to these nonparty plaintiffs in addition to requiring
them to pay the amounts specified in the contracts would effectively nullify
contractual advantages bargained for and obtained in good faith.5 ' While
this argument contains more inherent logic than the preceding one, the very
existence of the administrative remedy as the primary mechanism for dis-
pute resolution strips the stipulated-damages-as-the-sole-remedy-for-breach
argument of its vital force. Nowhere was it provided nor did the court ever
intimate that in resolving contract disputes the government contract officer,
the Secretary of Labor, or the courts were to be limited by the amounts
stated.
48. Id.
49. That this method of administrative dispute resolution has become an increasingly
common phenomenon and thus should probably be given a neutral connotation at best was
apparently not viewed worthy of consideration by the court. The pervasiveness of such activity
is easily documented and a legislative prescription of such a procedural remedy in the type of
legislation under discussion is to be anticipated. See generally Stone, The Twentieth Century
Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (1964).
50. 11 Cal. 3d at 402, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
51. Id. at 403, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590. The dissent took sharp issue with the
court's characterization of these provisions as liquidated damages clauses: "These so-called
'liquated damages' clauses nowhere purport to limit damages to the specified refunds. Nothing
in the contracts limits the rights of the government or, more importantly, plaintiffs' class, to
seek additional relief. As I noted above, the fact that the government could also sue for breach
of the contracts does not affect the rights of third party beneficiaries." Id. at 414, 521 P.2d at
855, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 599 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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3. The Significance of Restatement Section 145
To support its finding that there was no government intent to allow
plaintiffs' recovery under these contracts, the majority opinion augmented
with section 145 the requirements it had erected from section 133 of the
Restatement of Contracts.52 Section 145, which specifically applies to third
party beneficiary suits on contracts in which a governmental entity is the
promisee,53 reads as follows:
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or municipality
by contract to do an act or render a service to some or all of the
members of the public, is subject to no duty under the contract to
such members to give compensation for the injurious conse-
quences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of failings to
do so, unless, . . . an intention is manifested in the contract, as
interpreted in the light of circumstances surrounding its formation,
that the promisor shall compensate members of the public for such
injurious consequences. .... 54
The majority responded to plaintiffs' argument that section 145 was inappli-
cable to the facts of this case by asserting that even if plaintiffs were correct,
they still could not recover as third party beneficiaries because section 145
was merely a special application of sections 133(1)(a) and 135; section 145
alone did not confer any independent standing upon a third party plaintiff.
Thus, since plaintiffs did not qualify as donee beneficiaries under section
133, they could not recover under section 145.55 The court then backtracked
and, on the basis of evidence of the intended national scope of benefits
gathered from the congressional statement of purpose in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964,56 concluded that "Section 145 of the Restatement
of Contracts does preclude [the plaintiffs'] recovery because the services
which the contracts required the defendants to perform were to be rendered
52. Id. at 404, 521 P.2d at 847, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
53. For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties surrounding this problem, see text
accompanying notes 20-22 supra. See also Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A
Proposal, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 406 (1957); Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Intention
Standard: A Search for Rational Contract Decision-Making, 54 VA. L. REV. 1166 (1968).
54. 11 Cal. 3d at 401-02, 521 P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (emphasis added and
omissions made by the court).
55. Id. at 404, 521 P.2d at 847, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 591. Section 133 is set out in note 19
supra. Section 135 reads as follows:
"Duties Created by a Gift Promise
':Except as stated in section 140,
"(a) a gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the promisor to the donee beneficiary to
perform the promise; and the duty can be enforced by the donee beneficiary for his own
benefit;
"(b) a gift promise also creates a duty of the promisor to the promisee to render the
promised performance to the donee beneficiary."
56. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed 1972).
Fall 1977]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
to 'members of the public' within the meaning of that section." 57
The evidence is persuasive, however, that section 145 was misapplied
to the facts of the Martinez case. In the first place, it was unreasonable to
lump the plaintiffs and the class they represented into one category, that is,
characterizing all such individuals as intended recipients of a service de-
signed to benefit "some or all of the members of the public" and thus
rendering plaintiffs unable to maintain an action in their own right. While
plaintiffs and their class did undeniably constitute some of the public, they
had a much different status in the context of the instant suit. They were in
fact the specific, identified, and certified hardcore unemployed persons
residing in the East Los Angeles area who were the subject of the contract
between the government and the defendants. 58 Plaintiffs and their class were
the only status occupants involved out of the public population of almost
two hundred million. The degree of status differentiation between the
citizenry at large and the plaintiffs was significant enough on its face to
entitle their argument in this regard to much more serious consideration than
it received.
The dissenting opinion's approach to this critical issue was con-
siderably more compelling. In its view, the object of section 145 was to
qualify the possibly overbroad language of section 133 by requiring that the
government-defendant contract manifest a "clear intent" to compensate a
member of the public in the event of a defendant-promisor breach.
Section 145 does not, however, entirely preclude the application of
the "donee beneficiary" concept to every government contract.
Whenever, as in the instant case, such a contract expresses an
intent to benefit directly a particular person or ascertainable class
of persons', section 145 is, by its terms, inapplicable and the con-
tract may be enforced by the beneficiaries pursuant to the general
provisions of section 133.1 9
The dissent's view that section 145 should not bar a cause of action by
claimants such as those in the Martinez case gains further support if the
57. 11 Cal. 3d at 404, 521 P.2d at 847, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (emphasis in original). In
support of the conclusion that the principle of section 145 applied to these facts to bar recovery
by plaintiffs, Chief Justice Wright relied upon the reporter's comment to the same Restatement
provision included in the Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Id. at 403
n.3, 521 P.2d at 846 n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590 n.3. Yet as the dissenting opinion indicated, that
comment, when read in light of the stated legislative goal, would seem more likely to lead to an
opposite conclusion. Id. at 412-13, 521 P.2d at 853, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Members of the general public are designated as incidental beneficiaries, but attention is not
directed in the comment to an identified group such as these plaintiffs. Moreover, the concern
is to avoid the payment of consequential damages. Nowhere in the section or its comments is
there an indication that the promisor's potential liability to third parties for compensatory
damages was a motivating force in erecting a barrier to recovery.
58. See note 33 supra.
59. 13 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 521 P.2d at 853, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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purpose of that section is considered. The considerations that formed the
philosophical basis of this Restatement provision sprang from suits in which
consequential damages were sought. 60 The concern was to establish some
parameters around enterprise liability and to lubricate the wheels of com-
merce by allowing persons engaged in entreprenurial activity to avoid
commercial responsibility for consequences unanticipated and therefore
unaccounted for in the bargaining transaction that gave rise to the controver-
sy. In the instant case, the plaintiffs' claims fell under two headings. They
first sought to recover wages calculated at the minimum rate for twelve
months' employment. Such damages are unquestionably compensatory in
nature and should clearly have been foreseen and accounted for in precon-
tract bargaining. The specter of prohibitively costly judgments was thus
absent. Plaintiffs then sought $1,000 each for loss of training for each of the
jobs the defendants contracted to provide. This claim contained a stronger
flavor of consequential damages than did the first; again, however, the
element of surprise and excessive, unanticipated expense was absent, since
training these specific individuals was surely a basic component of the
contract. Moreover, the monetary rheasure of the value of such training was
readily calculable.
The broad reliance placed upon sections 133 and 145 of the Restate-
ment in both majority and dissenting opinions is reflective of the extraordi-
nary influence those provisions have had since they were promulgated in
1932. Few opinions in this subject area have been decided since that time
with other than the Restatement framework for analysis. In California, the
vitality of the Restatement has tended to lessen the influence and indepen-
dent development of the statutory provision addressed specifically to the
third party beneficiary problem. Originally enacted in 1872, section 1559 of
the California Civil Code provides: "A contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the
parties thereto rescind it."61 In fact, this legislative enactment has been
engulfed by the Restatement, on the guiding assumption that the code
sections embody general common law principles and that those principles
are enunciated in the Restatement provisions with respect to the third party
beneficiary problem. Not only are the California opinions articulated in
terms of the creditor-donee beneficiary distinction, but the disiositive issue
in the cases is analyzed in terms of the same "intent to benefit" rationale
adopted in the Restatement. 62 Thus, while the statutory phrase "expressly
for the benefit of a third person" 63 provided the possibility of an expandable
60. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
61. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1559 (West 1954).
62. For a detailed consideration of the early California cases, see Langmaid, Contracts for
the Benefit of Third Persons in California, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1938).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 1954).
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standard capable of accommodating changes in developments, its impact in
this regard has been distinctly muted. It is thus possible to conclude that "its
connotative meaning having been destroyed by judicial interpretation, the
term 'expressly' has now come to mean merely the negative of 'incidental-
ly.' ",64 It was also entirely predictable that when the plaintiffs in the
Martinez case relied upon section 1559, the court should give it no force
independent of the Restatement guidelines. Chief Justice Wright's opinion
in fact devoted only one sentence to the code provision before subsuming it
into the Restatement. 65 The dissenting opinion also failed to pursue vigor-
ously 66 the possible use of this section for creative analysis of the state's
legislative purposes in enacting section 1559 and the congressional purposes
in enacting the legislation under which the contracts at issue were au-
thorized.
In sum, the combination of a variety of factors-each disputed by the
strongly worded dissent-led the court to conclude that no third party
beneficiary status existed. The result was neither unpredictable nor without
precedent. Nevertheless, the opinion is both unsettling and unsatisfying in
its failure to plumb sympathetically the social, economic, and political
context in which this controversy arose, and to generate criteria for third
party beneficiary status in government contract cases.
III. An Alternative Approach
It was suggested earlier that one danger of a legal system built upon the
concept of stare decisis is that, at times, precedent has a tendency to be its
own justification. 67 That a contract is consensual is axiomatic. When a
problem of contract construction arises, the legal system's natural response
is thus a quest for the meaning, that is, the intention of the parties who used
the terms. Two factors should be recognized in this search for meaning.
First, in many, if not most, situations in which the parties are silent upon a
given subject, they probably had no intention at all with respect to it. 68
64. Note, Martinez v. Socoma Companies: Problems in Determining Contract Be-
neficiaries' Rights, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 149 (1975).
65. "Plaintiffs contend they are third party beneficiaries under Civil Code section 1559
which provides: 'A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced
by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.' This section excludes enforcement of a
contract by persons who are only incidentally or remotely benefited by it." 11 Cal. 3d at 400,
521 P.2d at 844-45, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
66. The dissenting opinion's consideration of section 1559 is as brief as that of the
majority. Id. at 408, 521 P.2d at 852, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 594 (Burke, J., dissenting).
67. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
68. "'Intention of the parties' is a good formula by which to square doctrine with result.
That this is true has long been an open secret." Parev Products Co. v. Rokeach & Sons, 124
F.2d 147, 149 (1941) (Clark, J.).
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Second, a legal relation exists, in a fundamental sense, irrespective of the
intention of the parties. 69 As a result, although courts speak forcefully and
convincingly of having discovered the intention of the parties, this discovery
is in fact an agreed fiction. While not ideal, this fiction has proved to be
reasonably serviceable over time. At any rate, the doctrine of the "intention
of the parties" is firmly established as a constellation in the legal firmament;
it is highly unlikely that the notion will be supplanted.70
The basic weakness in the court's analysis in Martinez was that it
hewed too closely and uncritically to a unitary concept of intention to benefit
that in turn obscured the reality of the contract situation at hand. If intention
is to be a guiding criterion, especially in the third party beneficiary context,
the opinion should have reflected the difficulty of the discovery process and
the wide variety of factors involved in reaching a conclusion. As Professor
Corbin has stated,
the ideas that lie behind such terms as "purpose," "motive," and
"intention" are obscure and elusive, as has been found in the
criminal law as well as the civil. When a contract is made, the two
or more contracting parties have separate purposes; each is
stimulated by various motives, of some of which he may not be
acutely conscious. The contract itself has no purpose, motive or
intent. The parties have purposes, motives, and intentions; but
they never have quite the same ones.71
The determinative choice being a judicial one, the least that can be expected
is a prejudgment consideration of all the relevant data at hand. The Martinez
court should have moved far beyond its excessively rigid conception of
legislative and administrative purpose or intention into a detailed exposition
of the motivating forces behind the enactments on which the contracts at
issue were based. This would have included an analysis of the Johnson
Administration program under which the enabling legislation was proposed,
an examination of the factors at work in the Congress that enacted this
69. "In the making of contracts parties do not often consciously advert to the legal
relations that will be created by their expressions. They attempt to make no analysis of those
relations, even if they are competent to do so. The existence of legal relations is not dependent
upon an intent to create them. If one party makes a promise to another who gives a sufficient
consideration in return, these facts will create a right and a duty even though the parties are
quite unaware of the law or of what a 'consideration' is. There is no more reason for requiring
an intent to create a 'right' in a third party than for requiring an intent to create one in a direct
promisee. If any particular intent is required at all, the only intent that is necessary is an intent
on the part of the promisee that the performance beneficial to the third party shall be rendered
by the promisor." CORBIN, supra note 16, § 777 at 25.
70. See Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A Proposal, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 406
(1957).
71. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 766 at 14-15.
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legislation, and a consideration of the Department of Labor's goals and
procedures.
Few national programs in this century have been better documented
than those springing from the quest for the so-called Great Society. Few
presidents have spoken as often and as forcefully about their desire to
improve the condition of individual Americans as did President Lyndon B.
Johnson. 72 Congressional debates, comments, explanations in the media by
cabinet officers and other bureaucrats, and a general public debate regarding
these federal expenditures that became increasingly clamorous and divisive
are all a part of the public record. If an understanding of the effect of these
factors informed the decision in Martinez, there is little clue to this effect in
Chief Justice Wright's opinion. Instead, it severely narrowed the permiss-
ible scope of section 1559 of the California Civil Code and laid an inade-
quate foundation for its conclusion that section 145 of the Restatement of
Contracts barred a recovery by plaintiffs under the ordinary principles of
Restatement section 133. As a consequence, little guidance is provided for
the future as to who is or is not an intended beneficiary of a government
contract. Meaningful progress toward a resolution of this important question
remains for future determination.
Conclusion
Syllogisms are seductive, and the type of logic that they encourage is
likely to lead astray both the unwary and the unadventurous by over-
encouragement of a myopic view. The Martinez opinion fell prey to the
syllogism that suggests that recipients of perceived government largesse
must be mere incidental beneficiaries of a contract in the absence of express
language to the contrary. If, however, the court had viewed the law as an
instrument of social order that advances through a series of self-correcting
hypotheses,7 3 then the third party beneficiary problem before it would have
provided a fertile field for judicial craftsmanship.
72. "These gigantic aspirations-although clearly unattainable v. ithin one Presidency, or
one generation-were not, however, intended merely as rhetorical exhortation. They expressed
Johnson's intention to embark on a mammoth program of social reform. The climate that made
it possible for a President to adopt such large ambitions and to succeed in enacting so many of
his proposals was the product of converging historical circumstances. The shock of Kennedy's
death, the civil rights movement, an emerging awareness of the extent and existence of poverty,
a reduction of threatening tensions between the United States and Soviet Union, all helped
Americans to focus public energies and perceptions on the problems of their own country.
More important was the deepening confidence that sustained economic growth; steadily in-
creasing affluence seemed now an enduring and irreversible reality of American life. Therefore
the problem was no longer simply the creation of wealth-that would continue-but how best to
apply our riches to the improvement of American life." D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM 211 (1976).
73. See generally W. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (2d ed. 1972).
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The troubled history of the third party beneficiary concept is well
known. Some of the encrustations around it have gradually given ground: 74
for example, privity is no longer viewed as the noblest possible state of
"contractual grace." Recognizing that at least a good part of the logic of
law has been economics, the legal system has also found it expedient to
separate the critical areas of trusts75 and insurance76 from general third party
beneficiary principles. When faced with status citizen claimants similar to
those in the Martinez case, a court's most reasonable course may be to draw
a sharp distinction between nonparty claimants in private as opposed to
government contracts and to formulate separate guidelines for each. The
problems--especially the critical ones of intention and purpose-are distinct
and would benefit from a separate focus allowing for more conceptual
clarity. The question of the promisee's duty to the beneficiary, for example,
has never received full judicial amplification in the government contract
context. It may be that if such conceptual divisions were drawn, duties
toward specific subgroups of the public might be such as to allow them to
bring their own actions against the promisor.
Alternatives to contract recovery need to be explored in greater depth.
It is likely that at least in some of the government cases, there will be
sufficient administrative redress against the defaulting promisor to satisfy
fully the interests of the beneficiary. Where suitable redress is not otherwise
available, a writ of mandate or similar remedy might be a reasonable
alternative. Finally, it may be that, while the intention to benefit individual
subgroups of society is clear, allowing individual or class actions by such
groups represents an intolerable social burden. 77 If this conclusion is reach-
ed, however, it should be stated forthrightly so that its utility and relative
merit are open to public view and challenge.
74. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 16, § 778 at 28-31; WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 354 at
819-20; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
75. See I A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 14.3 (3d ed. 1967).
76. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW (1971).
77. As previously noted, this fear actuated the conclusions of an earlier line of cases
represented by H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra. Although not pursued in the opinion, this
argument was apparently made with some force by the defendants in the Martinez case:
"[T]he only method by which the Federal Government could attract substantial private
corporations to participate in the Special Impact Programs was to provide them with such a
ceiling of maximum liability, thus insuring protection from astronomical damage claims by
intended recipients or beneficiaries of the Program. To fail to provide this protection would
have been to dissuade private companies from participation in the program out of the fear that
third party beneficiary suits by a class of the literally thousands of intended beneficiaries of the
Program would not only inundate the participating corporation but would financially bankrupt
it." Brief for Respondents at 21, Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1972),
quoted in Comment, Third Party Beneficiaries in Government Contracts, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
126, 133 n.36 (1975).
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